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Abstract 
Recession has sharply erected the question of tax burden and the optimal proportion 
of different kinds of taxes among the incomes of the budget. Indirect taxes and 
consumption taxes, which proportion is different according to different 
methodologies, dominate in Estonian state budget. The buoyancy of a tax system 
based on taxes of that kind is especially weak during the recession.  
Difficulties concerning the incomes of budget have arisen the necessity for lifting 
taxes, which is possible as the tax burden is low now. But a sharp question of the 
optimal level of taxes is going to be raised. A formula for indirect tax optimum 
according to Ramsey taxes and Slutski decomposition has been proposed in the 
article. 
Keywords: Taxation, tax burden, Estonian state budget, Ramsey taxes, indirect tax 
optimum.
The problem  
Everybody is familiar with the saying that death and taxes are the two most 
unpleasant as well as inescapable things. There are many goods that cannot be 
provided by the private sector but only by the state. Furthermore, with many goods 
provided by the private sector it is not possible to identify a consumer who would 
have to pay for them. It is the state that has to pay for these so-called public goods. 
According to Wagner’s law the income elasticity of public expenditures is greater 
than 1, therefore the demand for state-financed services grows in proportion to the 
increase of income. That also means an increased demand for state budget revenues, 
mostly taxes. According to a popular opinion the state budget revenues should 
contain at least 90% taxes (loans not included). 
Bigger state budget also means bigger taxes. Taxes in turn diminish the resources 
available to households and therefore welfare. So the question arises – which is 
bigger, the decrease in welfare of households and the state as a whole due to an 
increase of taxes, or the rise in welfare due to public goods and an increase in 
consumption? Naturally both these effects become evident through the behaviour of 
economic agents. Accordingly, with all taxes there is a question of their impact on 
the short- and long-term behaviour of economic agents. 
In economic theory, this question can be approached from two viewpoints. First, it is 
possible to point out a set of principles, parameters and arguments, and construct 
models based on theoretical considerations, without taking into account particular 
numerical data. The other function of the theory is to provide a scientific set of 
analytical devices for the empirical data that would make giving practical 213
suggestions possible. This part of the theory also needs to explain what kind of data 
from the millions of practical cases need to be gathered. 
Not all of these interconnected problems can be discussed on these pages. We set out 
to consider two issues: first, to demonstrate the large proportion of indirect taxes in 
Estonian state budget, and second, to consider the problem of optimum in indirect 
taxing. 
Eliminating extranalities  
As a general rule, establishing or increasing taxes also raises prices. Accordingly, the 
reaction of households to taxes consists of the sum of two effects – income and 
substitution effect (the latter can be marginal, if the prices of all goods rise in 
proportion to the tax increase. But as the demand and supply elasticities of goods 
differ, this possibility is only theoretical and will therefore not be consider here). To 
achieve actual substitution effect the rise in prices needs to be compensated to the 
consumer. There are two possibilities for that – either to grant a specific amount of 
money to the consumer (household) based on the method introduced to the 
economic theory by Slutsky, or to try to compensate for the increase of prices to 
both the consumer and the supplier. If we choose the first option, Pareto effective 
situation is achievable (of course, in the absence of external effects and on the 
condition that indifference curve and isoquant are traditional) as a point of balance 
where the state incomes and expenditures for ensuring purchase power are even. The 
second option is of primarily theoretical interest as it would entail moving sums of 
money back and forth, and the final result would be marginal. We will not examine 
this option. 
Tax elasticity, buoyancy and incidence 
With any taxation system, three of its characteristics are of vital importance: 
elasticity, buoyancy and incidence. First of these shows the ability of a tax or of the 
system of all nationwide taxes to generate increased tax revenues in case of positive 
shifts in the object of taxation, primarily income or turnover. In practice, of course, 
tax elasticity depends on not only the type of tax, but also (if not primarily) on the 
structure of the system of collecting the particular tax. There are different 
approaches to buoyancy, but for the purposes of this study it is sufficient to regard it 
as a certain elasticity indicator in the situation where negative shifts are taking place 
in the object of taxation. The greater the buoyancy of a tax (and the whole system of 
taxation), the smaller the risk that in case of negative deviation in economy, 
primarily in the object of taxation, state income is significally reduced or the tax 
system even collapses. 
The problem of the elasticity and buoyancy of tax systems was posed already in 
1959 by R. A. Musgrave (Musgrave 1959). Since then, all taxes connected with 
consumership and sale (sale tax, excises, VAT etc) have been regarded as elastic. 
With income tax, opinions vary – it has been regarded as both elastic and anelastic. 
Customs tax and duties are universally regarded as anelastic (Goode et al. 1984). 214
With buoyancy, the situation is more difficult. When it comes to analysis of 
buoyancy, authors either confine themselves to the analysis of elasticity in certain 
special cases (in the case of negative elasticity coefficient) or essentially forgot it. 
The reason for that is simple – during the past few decades there has been no 
opportunity to study national tax systems in a situation of clear economic 
depcession. The last bigger and more widespread depression took place in 1974-75 
and even that was due to external factors (negative supply shock caused by oil 
prices), and therefore the analysis of the data from that period does not always 
produce “pure” results. Of course, it is not advisable to confine oneself to mere 
theoretical approaches or make conclusions based on 50-year-old data. In that sense 
the current depcession in Estonia and elsewhere is an interesting base material for 
future research. However, these analyses can be properly made only in a few years’ 
time. 
The questions of tax incidence have received more attention. The spreading on tax 
burden between demandant and supplier, but also between different social strata of 
varying income, is the key question of not only taxation, but of all macroeconomics 
and economic policy. By how much does the income of a certain social stratum 
decrease in real life and how much does the demand drop as a consequence? If the 
supplier becomes the tax bearer, then by how much do the prices rise? How much 
does that in turn reduce demand? It is a wide-spread view that indirect taxes, which 
dominate in developing countries and make up a particularly large percentage in 
Estonia, are regressive towards income. Unfortunately the latest in-depth statistical 
studies in that field date back to more than 30 years ago, when the tax systems of 
newly independent developing countries were actively researched. As those 
countries quickly changed the structure of their taxes, there are almost no studies 
about countries with a tax system analogous to that of Estonia today. Even of 
Eastern European countries only Latvia has a tax structure similar to Estonia. 
Estonian taxation structure  
In the initial stage of its tranition period, Estonia (like most other Eastern European 
countries) was in a unique position – it essentially lacked a taxation system, a vital 
instrument of economic policy, which now needed to be constructed. In a perfect 
world, that would have meant building a system based on contemporary economic 
theory. Unfortunately Eastern European countries lacked pertinent knowledge, both 
in regard to taxation theory and the economic situation (an accurate description of 
the development phase and the processes). 
Estonian budget and tax systems were largely developed in 1993-1994 and many of 
their key features have remained unchanged. The only important change has been 
the abolition of corporate income tax in 2000 (that experiment will not be analyzed 
here). Estonian tax system has been praised as unique, simple and conductive to 
economy, and criticized as primitive, helpless, not boosting the economy and 
generating social discrepancies. It is an issue of difference of values (as well as 
political competition) that have a particularly acute expression in this context. When 215
it comes to taxes, vastly different viewpoints are presented not only in scientific 
publications but also in textbooks (Truu 1987; Stiglitz 1995). 
So what characterizes the Estonian tax system? Its characteristic features are a 
relatively low tax burden, simplicity bordering on primitiveness (which has 
significantly reduced the possibilities of using taxes as a control device of 
economy), a very high percentage of indirect and consumption taxes. 
The tax burden in Estonia has been 33.7-35.1% since Estonia joined the EU 
(Estonian Ministry of Finance website; the data are slightly different in various parts 
of the website). That is lower than the EU average (41-42%). However, these 
numbers are not comparable. Estonian state budget includes social benefits tax, 
which has for many years been the greatest source of income for the state budget 
(Table 1). In most EU member states such a tax does not exist or is slight. When that 
is taken into account, the tax burden in Estonia appears to be about 25-26%. 
Table 1. Income from taxes in Estonian state budget 2005-2008 (in milliards of 
kroons)
2005 2006 2007  2008
(provisional)
Total taxes  53831 55208 67718 70396
Personal income tax  10911 3846 4786 4328
Corporate income tax  2365 3123 4083 4166
VAT 14021 18645 22304 20548
Excises 6424 7030 8195 8971
  excise on tobacco  1205 1208 1529 2519
  excise on alcohol  1838 2089 2314 2434
  excise on fuel  3363 3728 4353 4697
  excise on packaging  …    3   …     1
Gambling tax  292   354 467 484
Customs tax  347 401   549 508
Social benefits tax  18392 21764 27268 31299
Other taxes  1079   45    66   92
Source: Author’s calculations based on Estonian Ministry of Finance website. 
The economic crisis has brought attention to the issue of tax structure. Table 1 
presents taxes in Estonian state budget from 2005, i.e after Estonia joined the EU. It 
is difficult to assess what is the percentage of indirect taxes in Estonian state budget. 
Indirect taxes clearly include VAT, excises and the customs tax. However, also the 
gambling tax has some features characteristic to indirect taxes, as it is not imposed 
on the revenues from economic activities but rather as a preventive lump-sum tax, 
i.e before launching the slot machine etc. The tax sum is transfered by the manager 
of the gambling business in some way (e.g by raising drink prices) to the actual 
bearer – the gambler, i.e consumer. Accordingly this tax also has the incidence 216
characteristic of indirect taxes and therefore it is more accurate to regard it as an 
indirect tax (at least when it is established in such a way as in Estonia). 
As far as we know, there is no other country that has social benefits tax in the form 
that it exists in Estonia. The tax is paid by the employer, but it is calculated based on 
the amount of money paid to the employee. That tax is meant only for pensions and 
healthcare, i.e it functions largely as retirement and health insurance. Clearly, the 
defining criterium here is whether the emplyee’s salary would increase by the 
amount that makes up the social benefits tax if that tax was abolished. If yes, the 
social benefits tax has enough characteristic features to regard it as an indirect tax; if 
not, the features of direct taxes probably prevail (the social benefits tax is the 
employer’s expenditure). As this question is impossible to answer properly, authors 
classify it arbitrarily, depending on their views, as either a direct or indirect tax. 
Eurostat has taken a “diplomatic” position and classifies that Estonian social tax as a 
labour tax, regarding it therefore as primarily a resource tax (Eurostat. Taxation), but 
that is not entirely accurate as the income from social benefits tax is allocated for 
certain social expenditures. 
It is probably reasonable to bring out the percentage of indirect taxes in different 
versions, with social benefits tax included and not. In the first case, the percentage of 
indirect taxes has made up 75.3-87.8% of state budget revenues ever since Estonia 
joined the EU; in the latter case the percentage has been 41.1-53.6%. If we take the 
first approach, we arrive at what is clearly the biggest percentage of indirect taxes 
among EU member states; even with the second approach the result is well above 
EU average. 
When trying to determine the percentage of consumption taxes in Estonian state 
budget, we likewise have to face the question of how to classify some taxes that are 
different from those in other countries. Again we are talking mainly about social 
benefits tax. In the form that it exists in Estonia, it has been regarded as a tax on 
using one of the goods – labour – and hence as a resource tax. That, however, raises 
the question of whether it is a consumption tax. It is not the purpose of this study to 
discuss whether the multifunctional tax established during the transition period when 
there was no economicic-theoretical knowledge available belongs to this or that 
category. Therefore – although the author does not share the opinion that the social 
benefits tax as it exists in Estonia is a consumption tax – also the percentage of 
consumption taxes has been given in two versions in Table 2 – with social benefits 
tax included and not. It is clear that consumption taxes include VAT and excises. But 
does the customs tax on alcohol, furniture, meat etc count as a consumption tax? 
More likely yes – without consumption there is no tax. It is also certain that customs 
increase the prices and limit consumption – nobody will import if there is no 
demand. Gambling tax, as it exists in Estonia, should probably be classified as a 
consumption tax as well. Factor payments for the local governments can also be 
counted in, but these are not reflected in the state budget and will therefore not be 
considered here. 217
Table 2. Indirect taxes in Estonian state budget 2005-2008.  
2005 2006 2007  2008
(provisional) 
Total taxes  53831 55208 67718 70396 
Indirect taxes (social benefits tax 
included)   40505 48217 58816  61856 
Percentage of indirect taxes  
(%, social benefits tax included)   75.3  87.3  86.9  87.8 
Indirect taxes (social benefits tax not 
included)   22113 29572 31548  30557 
Percentage of indirect taxes  
(%, social benefits tax not included)   41.1  53.6  46.6  43.4 
Consumption taxes, social benefits tax 
included 40505 48217 58816  61856 
Percentage of consumption taxes  
(%, social benefits tax included)   75.3  87.3  86.9  87.8 
Consumption taxes, social benefits tax 
not included  22113 29572 31548 30557 
Percentage of consumption taxes  
(%, social benefits tax not included)   41.1  53.6  46.6 43.4 
Note. Of “other taxes” 50% have been taken to be indirect. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the data from Table 1. 
As seen from the figures presented in Table 2, a peculiar situation has taken shape in 
Estonia – if we take the above considerations (which are, admittedly, debatable) into 
account when classifying taxes, the percentage and amount of indirect and 
consumption taxes in the state budget coincide. Regardless of how exactly we 
classify these taxes, we have to acknowledge that their proportion in the state budget 
is big. The figures in Table 1 and 2 also demonstrate the marginal role of 
environment taxes (which make up part of the “other taxes”) in Estonian state 
budget.
It only takes basic calculation of percentage to demonstrate the growing dominance 
of social benefits tax in Estonian state budget – from 34.2% in 2004 to 44.4% in 
2008. The economic crisis that started in 2008 will, however, in connection to the 
substantial rise in unemployment freeze the salaries to be paid in 2009. That in turn 
will lead to a drop in the income from social benefits tax. The halting of an increase 
in household incomes – or even their decrease – will, considering the big loan 
burden of households, lead to a decrease of VAT and excises. 
That has already put enormous pressure on the 2009 state budget – it is clear that the 
absolute sum will be significantly smaller than in 2008. The revenues of a budget 
based on consumption taxes will probably have good elasticity during periods when 
incomes and consumption are quickly rising, but the buoyancy of such a system is 
weak. All prognoses, without exception, predict a substantial decrease in the rate of 
inflation (which has been high, ca 10% during the past few years) or even a decrease 218
in prices (Estonian Ministry of Finance ...). Given the 44.4% social benefits tax and 
29.2% VAT in the 2008 state budget, that adds further pressure on the 2009 budget. 
The question of increasing Estonian tax burden has become relevant. That brings 
forward the issue of optimal tax rates. 
Optimal tax rates  
As mentioned earlier, the decrease in state budget revenues has raised the question 
of a possible increase of tax burden in Estonia, and that already in 2009. Next we 
will try to construct a model to determine the optimum of the dominant indirect 
taxes.
In an attempt to maintain comprehensiveness, we will base our model on two 
common views on model-construction in taxation theory. First, the state revenues 
from taxes come as lump-sum taxes straight from households, and second, any 
transaction between the consumer and the supplier increases state revenues. There 
are no external forces, the indifference curve and isoquant are standard. In the 
absence of any other taxes such premise leads to Pareto optimum in the point where 
the increase in state revenues and the purchasing power redistribution curve meets 
with the lump-sum taxes curve. Adding any other taxes directs us away from that 
point. Essentially we are trying to find a solution that would bring about an increase 
in state revenues by increasing consumption taxes, while reducing the welfare of 
households as little as possible. If we expect taxes to be used for an increase in 
social welfare, we can claim that when the left side of equation (1) exceeds the right 
side, the total social welfare has increased. 
To put it in the form of an equation: we are trying to choose the tax vector t in such a 
way as to maximize social welfare V(q). If we designate the total revenue of subjects 
from indirect taxes with R(t), we arrive at: 
           R(t) = t • X(q)  R ,   (1) 
where   X(q) is the vector of aggregated demand and  
              R  is the required tax revenue.  
With taxes imposed, a quantity q is supplied for price t, but the consumer pays the 
price (p+t). We designate the household welfare corresponding to quantity q with 
v(q) and the household demand with x(q) and arrive at equation (1). Again, V(q) is 
the rise of social welfare caused by an increase in taxes. 
The problem posed is easily solved if we use Ramsey’s rule of optimal taxes and 
Lagrange’s widespread method of determining maximum. We maximize V + Ȝ R, 
where Ȝ is the Lagrange multiplier, which in this case does not indicate the marginal 
utility of some particular good supplied by the private sector, but of the social 
welfare arising from the increase in state revenues. 219
We can write: 
   (2) 
If we make the substitution 
and use Slutsky’s compensated demand curve of demand derivative, we get: 
   (3,4) 
Sik
h is the derivative of Slutsky’s compensated demand curve on household h (the 
utility level preceding the tax increase has been maintained) and ıi is negative 
because there is a covariance, b
h, of the social marginal utility of the net income of 
household h (where the “net” means there is an adjusment to the social marginal 
utility, ȕ
h , for the marginal propensity to spend on taxes out of extra income, and b 
is the average of b
h ) and the consumption of good i by houshold h, (x
h
i). Thus, ıiis
higher the more good is consumed by those who have a low social marginal utility 
of income. 
As the above equations (1) and (2) take into account the most important aspects of 
the interconnection of taxes and social welfare, it can be successfully used to 
describe the social aspect of the efficiency of indirect taxes. However, these 
equations as well as those suggested earlier (Ahmed; Stern, 1989) are practicable 
only on the condition that we succeed in mathematically describing the function of 
the social welfare of households, from which we can then find the derivative. As a 
rule, the task of describing the function of the welfare of households is often difficult 
to solve with adequate accuracy, i.e the same kind of problems arise as in the case of 
using Hicks’s method to subtract the substitution and income effect. 
Conclusion
The following can be concluded from the above: 
1. Determining the percentage of indirect and consumption taxes in the whole tax 
burden is complicated as there is no generally accepted method for it. Also, several 
of the taxes used in Estonia possess features characteristic of both direct and indirect 
taxes. Furthermore, it is not clear what we should consider a consumption tax – only 220
those taxes that affect household consumption, or also corporate ones in case the tax 
is imposed on final consumption. 
2. Whichever approach we take to defining indirect and direct taxing, it is clear that 
indirect taxes prevail in the income of the Estonian state budget. The social benefits 
tax makes up a particularly big – and growing – proportion. Different approaches 
lead to the same conclusion: the percentage of consumption and indirect taxes in the 
state budget is equal, i.e indirect taxes have been imposed on consumption. 
3. The structure of the revenues of the Estonian state budget differs considerably 
from that of other EU member states. The percentage of environment taxes is 
negligible, while the peculiarly structured social benefits tax, which constitutes the 
greatest and increasing source of revenue of the state budget, is difficult to classify 
as either a direct, indirect or labour tax. Due to the huge proportion of consumption 
taxes the buoyancy of Estonian tax system is weak. The provisional conclusions of 
2008 demonstrate clearly that during periods of economic recession the state budget 
is very vulnerable. 
4. The shortfall of income to the state budget in 2008 and especially at the beginning 
of 2009 has forced the government to make cutbacks up to 10% and has acutely 
raised the issue of increasing the tax burden. As the tax burden in Estonia is 
substantially lower than the EU average, it is possible. However, that raises the 
question of the optimal tax burden. Based on Slutsky’s principle of compensated 
demand curve and Ramsey’s optimal tax theory we can take the optimal level of 
indirect taxes (which are dominant in Estonia) to be the point where the household 
welfare reduction curve and the social welfare increase curve intersect. 
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